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Abstract 
 
With the increasing use of private organisations to provide public services and the corresponding 
blurring of boundaries between the public and private sectors, can public servants be held to a 
distinct code of ethics or should public sector ethical standards be applied to private providers.  
This question is explored in the context of the Australian Commonwealth which has recently 
codified a set of public service values in legislation and where agencies are being asked to report 
on the extent to which they require contractors to comply with public service values.  Practice is 
evolving, with most emphasis on values relating to direct service to the public.  Public service 
values dealing with internal organisation and employment conditions, including the merit principle, 
are less likely to be extended to private contractors. 
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OUTSOURCING AND PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES.  
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
Richard Mulgan 
 
I 
The blurring and interpenetration of the public and private sectors has become 
a familiar theme in the last decade of public sector management studies, as 
governments devolve core activities to semi-autonomous quangos which are not 
easily categorised as either fully public or private organisations and as they engage in 
public-private partnerships for the provision of public services (Fredrickson 1997, 
Rhodes 1997, O’Toole 1997, Brereton and Temple 1999, Agranoff and McGuire 
2001).  An interesting corollary of this trend is its effect on what have been seen as 
exclusively public service values.  That public servants should be subject to a 
distinctive, and more demanding, ethical code is a longstanding assumption of public 
administration.  The rationale for such expectations rests on two unique aspects of 
government, its powers of legitimate coercion and, in a democracy, its ultimate 
accountability to the voters (Mulgan 2003, 36-8).    However, if the line between 
public and private sectors becomes more difficult to draw, how can a sharp distinction 
still be maintained between the special values expected from public servants and those 
espoused in the non-government sectors (Painter 2000, Kernaghan 2000)?   Can each 
side retain its distinctiveness or is a degree of ethical convergence inevitable 
(Freeman 2003)?   If convergence does develop, will it apply to all values or will 
certain core values remain unique to the public sector?  
In this paper, these issues are explored in connection with the move to 
outsourcing within the Commonwealth (federal) government of Australia.  Particular  
focus is placed on the extent to which private contractors providing public services 
are being required to comply with public service values.  Practice in this area will be 
seen to be in a state of flux and indecision.  On the one hand, governments have been 
forced to recognise the adverse political consequences of completely exempting 
contractors from public service standards.  On the other hand, they are reluctant to 
force contractors to comply totally with the public service code of ethics.  A new 
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consensus may be emerging that certain values are applicable to public servants only 
while other values apply to all providers of public services, whether drawn from the 
public or the private sectors.  However, such a consensus is far from uncontested and 
contains several grey areas of continuing dispute. 
An analytical advantage of focusing on the Australian experience is that the 
Commonwealth government, in its recent revision (1999) of the Public Service Act, 
gave particular prominence to Public Service Values, spelling out fifteen separate (if 
somewhat overlapping) values which were then supplemented by a formal Code of 
Conduct (itself containing thirteen clauses).  Moreover, the Australian Public Service 
Commission (APSC), deprived of the service-wide controls exercised by its 
predecessor, the Public Service Board (abolished in 1987), has focused its activities 
on monitoring performance in the Australian Public Service (APS).  This role has 
been reinforced in the new Public Service Act which makes the Commissioner 
responsible for determining the scope of the designated Values and for ensuring that 
the Australian Public Service ‘incorporates and upholds’ the Values (Section 11).  As 
part of its regular monitoring of compliance with the Values and Code, the 
Commission has been reviewing the extent to which government agencies are 
extending the Values and Code to private contractors.  
 Detailed evidence on the use of values in government contracts is not readily 
available because most contracts are treated as commercially confidential documents.  
However, the State of the Service reports published by the Australian Public Service 
Commission, drawing on its annual surveys (APSC 2001, 2002, 2003), include 
summaries of current practice illustrated by particular examples. Moreover, 
government agencies engaged in extensive outsourcing frequently publish general 
templates or guidelines which outsourcing contracts are required to follow.  Such 
statements will typically include reference to any general values that need to be 
covered in a contract.  If a complete picture is impossible, current trends can be 
identified with reasonable confidence. 
II 
Values and codes of conduct are by no means unique to the public sector. As 
private sector managers and business management experts increasingly recognise, any 
efficient and effective organisation depends on a shared corporate culture and on 
common ethical values.  When prompt and flexible decision-making is at a premium, 
managers must not be tied down by rigid directions.  The attempt to spell everything 
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out in advance must always founder on the complexity of events. Most present-day 
organisations are therefore placing greater emphasis on corporate values and 
teamwork rather than on detailed instructions as means of securing effective 
collective effort.  Commercial damage from fraudulent and dishonest executives has 
led to an increased stress on specifically ethical values, such as honesty, integrity and 
interpersonal trust.  Such values do not replace rules or legislation as means of 
controlling conduct but they are an essential supplement, particularly in uncertain and 
unpredictable situations.  
Despite the similarities between government and non-government 
organisations (as well as the differences within the respective sectors (Lawton 1998)), 
public servants are still expected to observe more precise standards of ethics in certain 
matters.  Most attempts to formulate public service values identify a few general and 
single-word values such as ‘honesty’, ‘integrity’, ‘impartiality’, ‘neutrality’ and 
‘accountability’ (eg Sherman 1998, 15-16; Kernaghan 2000, 95-6).  The Australian 
Commonwealth Public Service Act 1999 takes a more a more specific and concrete 
approach, describing fifteen distinct Values each of which is defined in a complete 
sentence [see box].   The broad thrust of the Values builds on a consensus about 
public sector ethics that evolved within the senior public service over the previous 
decade, notably through the Management Advisory Board (PSMPC 2001).  The 
precise formulation owes much to the immediate political context in which the new 
Act was drafted.  The initiative came from the right-of-centre Coalition government, 
first elected in 1997, which stressed new public management values of results-
oriented management derived from private sector practice. The articulation of values 
was seen as a substitute for cumbersome rule-bound employment procedures and part 
of a strategy to reduce the level of controls and regulations generally.   However, the 
government faced left-of centre opposition parties who held a majority in the upper 
house, the Senate, and who supported more traditional process-related values and the 
interests of public sector unions.  The last four Values in particular, which were added 
to the original 1997 bill to help it pass two years later, bear obvious traces of the 
political compromises forced on the government by opposition parties in the Senate.   
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The Australian Public Service Values 
(Public Service Act 1999 s 10 (1)) 
The APS Values are as follows:  
(a) the APS is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial and 
professional manner;  
(b) the APS is a public service in which employment decisions are based on 
merit;  
(c) the APS provides a workplace that is free from discrimination and 
recognises and utilises the diversity of the Australian community it serves;  
(d) the APS has the highest ethical standards;  
(e) the APS is openly accountable for its actions, within the framework of 
Ministerial responsibility to the Government, the Parliament and the Australian 
public;  
(f) the APS is responsive to the Government in providing frank, honest, 
comprehensive, accurate and timely advice and in implementing the 
Government's policies and programs;  
(g) the APS delivers services fairly, effectively, impartially and courteously to 
the Australian public and is sensitive to the diversity of the Australian public;  
(h) the APS has leadership of the highest quality;  
(i) the APS establishes workplace relations that value communication, 
consultation, co-operation and input from employees on matters that affect 
their workplace;  
(j) the APS provides a fair, flexible, safe and rewarding workplace;  
(k) the APS focuses on achieving results and managing performance;  
(l) the APS promotes equity in employment;  
(m) the APS provides a reasonable opportunity to all eligible members of the 
community to apply for APS employment;  
(n) the APS is a career-based service to enhance the effectiveness and cohesion 
of Australia's democratic system of government;  
(o) the APS provides a fair system of review of decisions taken in respect of 
APS employees.  
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To help impose some conceptual order on an awkward example of legislative 
drafting, the Australian Public Service Commission commonly, and usefully, re-
organises the Values under four general headings:  
(i) relationship with the government and the Parliament;  
(ii) relationship with the public;  
(iii) workplace relations; 
(iv) personal behaviours.   
The first category (i),  concerning the public service’s role in relation to  
government, includes:  
value (a) [that the APS] ‘is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial 
and professional manner’;  
value (b) [that the APS] ‘is a public service in which employment decisions 
are based on merit’; 
 value (e) [that the APS] ‘is openly accountable for its actions, within the 
framework of ministerial responsibility to the Government, the Parliament and 
the Australian public’; 
 value (f) [that the APS] ‘is responsive to the Government providing frank, 
honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice and in implementing the 
Government’s policies and programs’; 
 and value (k) that the APS ‘focuses on achieving results and managing 
performance’.   
The second category (ii), which deals with the public service’s relationships 
directly to the public, includes: 
 value (g), [that the APS] ‘delivers services fairly, effectively, impartially and 
courteously to the Australian public and is sensitive to the diversity of the 
Australian public’.    
This category obviously overlaps with the former category in that the public service’s 
duty to the government includes the duty to serve the public effectively and 
accountably.   
The third set of Values (iii) concerns the internal working of the service, for 
instance: 
value (b) [that the APS] ‘is a public service in which employment decisions 
are based on merit’;  
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value (c)[ that the APS] ‘provides a workplace that is free from discrimination 
and recognises and utilises the diversity of the Australian community it 
serves’; 
 value (h) [that the APS] ‘has leadership of the highest quality’; 
 value (i) [that the APS] establishes workplace relations that value 
communication, consultation, co-operation and input from employees on 
matters that affect their workplace’; 
 value (j) that [the APS] provides a fair, flexible, safe and rewarding 
workplace’; 
 value (l) [that the APS] promotes equity in employment; 
 value (m) [that the APS] provides a reasonable opportunity to all eligible 
members of the community to apply for APS employment; 
value (n) [that the APS] is a career-based service to enhance the effectiveness 
and cohesion of Australia’s democratic system of government; 
 and value (o) [that the APS] provides a fair system of review of decisions 
taken in respect of APS employees’.   
This category, which includes the four later additions, is the longest and least 
integrated, reflecting its origins in political compromise. Again overlap occurs 
between the two categories of internal and external values.  The merit principle, for 
instance (value (b)), applies both externally, to elected ministers (restricting their right 
to intervene in employment decisions) and to the public (in respect to their right to 
expect fair access to public employment), as well as internally to employment 
decisions taken by managers within a public agency. 
The final category (iv) , personal behaviour, covers the general, catch-all 
statement: 
value (d) [that the APS] ‘has the highest ethical standards’.   
One advantage of this comprehensive and specific account of public service 
values is that it helps to bring out the distinctiveness of such values.  Where values are 
described in simple terms, such as ‘impartiality’ or ‘accountability’, the generality of 
such concepts means that they can also be applied in the non-government sectors and 
therefore do not indicate what is particularly demanded of public servants in 
comparison with ethical members of other types of organisation.   However, once 
accountability is linked to political institutions such as parliament and ministers or 
impartiality is fleshed out as  implying an ‘apolitical’ profession and merit 
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appointment, the special requirements demanded of public servants become more 
apparent.  Admittedly, some of the Values are still hard to distinguish from those that 
might be expected from non-government employees, for instance the general 
injunction to have ‘the highest ethical standards’ (d) and ‘leadership of the highest 
quality’ (h).  In addition, some of the internal Values also simply reflect best 
employment practice regardless of sector, for instance value[ing] communication, 
consultation, cooperation and input from employees’ (i) or ‘focus[ing] on achieving 
results and managing performance’ (k).  Support for ‘free[dom] from discrimination’, 
workplace ‘diversity’ (c) and ‘equity in employment’ (l) is not unique to the public 
sector though these values tend to be more stringently applied in the public than the 
private sector.  
The most distinctively public service values, in the sense of values that are not 
normally required from private organisations, are: first, those that deal specifically 
with the institutions of government, such as political neutrality, merit appointment, 
accountability to ministers and Parliament, and responsiveness to government; 
secondly, those that involve the particular standards that citizens expect in their direct 
dealings with government, such as fair and impartial treatment; and thirdly, those that 
place unique expectations on workplace behaviour in the public sector, particularly 
merit appointment with its implication of a strong version of equal opportunity and 
workplace diversity as well as review of employment decisions.  Of these values, 
some deal directly with outcomes or the substance of government decisions, for 
instance responsiveness to government and fair and impartial treatment of the public.  
Others, however, relate more to process issues, for instance, accountability to 
government, parliament and the public, merit appointment (including equal 
opportunity and workplace diversity), and political impartiality.  They may have an 
important impact on policy outcomes but are primarily focused on the procedures by 
which such outcomes are brought about.   
Each of these distinctive public service values is underpinned by a wide range 
of specific legal and administrative rules and does not depend solely on adherence to 
the general values as such.   Thus, for instance, in the Public Service Act the merit 
principle is spelled out in detailed sections on the prohibition of patronage and 
favouritism (s 17) and limitations on ministerial directions to agency heads (s 19). 
Values are a complementary mechanism, to help reinforce compliance with rules and 
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regulations and to reduce the need to rely on formal compliance rather than flexible, 
individual judgment. 
III 
If such values are generally expected of public servants providing public 
services, how far are the same values extended to private contractors providing 
similar services from the public purse?   This question involves two separate issues.  
First, to what extent are private contractors required to match up to distinctively 
public sector standards in fulfilling government contracts.  For instance, are they 
obliged to be responsive to government or to practice equal employment opportunity?  
Secondly, in so far as private contractors are held to public service standards, to what 
extent do governments need to resort to general values as such as a means of 
enforcing such standards, rather than relying on specific contractual requirements.  
Values, it is to be remembered, are not the only means of securing desired objectives.  
Equally important are specific laws, regulations and guidelines that public servants 
are obliged to follow.   
In dealing with private contractors, governments can be expected to place 
greater reliance on specific instructions rather than on general values.  The contract 
relationship assumes contracting parties with divergent interests operating in a 
competitive market-style environment. Governments typically attempt to achieve their 
desired outcome through detailed, unambiguous specification of what they want the 
contractor to deliver.  Neither party can be automatically expected to perform any 
service not clearly stipulated in the contract nor to share the other party’s objectives 
and values.   While public servants may have been inculcated into an ethical 
commitment to serve the public impartially and to be responsive to the government’s 
view of the public interest, private contractors will typically see no further than their 
own need to make a profit.  The original rationale of contracting out, and many of the 
more straightforward ‘classic’ contracts, place little emphasis on values of any kind, 
let alone distinctive public service values (see eg Industry Commission 1996).  
Instead they stress the importance of specifying the desired outputs as precisely and 
objectively as possible, without relying on any value input on the part of the 
contractor. Whereas generalised values are a means of achieving desired results 
without the need to spell out all requirements in detail, classic contracts rely on 
detailed ex ante specification.  In this respect, then, values and classic contracts are 
polar opposites.  
  9
Many outsourcing contracts, however, cannot totally avoid some reference to 
general values, particularly if the service being outsourced is comparatively complex 
and politically sensitive. Indeed, many government contracts are better classified not 
as ‘classic’ contracts, where matters are specified in advance, but as ‘relational’ 
contracts, sometimes known as known as ‘partnerships’ or ‘alliances’, which define a 
more open-ended relationship between the two parties (Sclar 2000).   In such 
contracts, the parties agree to cooperate for shared purposes which are specified in 
only very general terms, the details being left to be worked out as the relationship 
proceeds. This type of contract, for instance, is commonly used for the provision of 
ongoing services such as information technology or personnel services. More and 
more contractual relationships between governments and private providers are now of 
this relational type or at least include important relational elements (Considine 2001; 
Barrett 2001; Grimshaw, Vincent and Willmott 2002).  Such contracts may specify 
some precise deliverables, as in a classic contract, but they will also include an 
agreement to cooperate in the pursuit of common objectives and, to cover unforeseen 
circumstances, may need to include a contractual commitment to more general values.   
Agency guidelines for contractors regularly include obligations to respect 
general ethical values which are common to both public and private sectors, for 
instance values such as honesty, integrity and fair dealing.  For instance, the Code of 
Conduct for the Australian ‘Job Network’ ( private contractors who provide 
employment assistance for the unemployed) requires members of the network to act 
‘with honesty, due care and diligence’ and to behave ‘ethically and professionally’ 
(DEWR 2004).  The Code of Conduct in Contracting of the Department of Education 
Science and Training expects that its ‘business partners’ will ‘deal honestly’ and 
‘behave in a highly ethical manner’ (DEST 2004).  Reference to such values is clearly 
intended to supplement and reinforce any legal obligations on the part of the 
contractors to abide by the terms of the contract as well as by other relevant laws, 
such as those against fraud or negligence.     
Beyond such non-specific values, however, contractors are sometimes 
required to take account of values more peculiarly suited to the public sector. As the 
Australian Public Service Commission reports, agencies have taken a variety of 
approaches to the issue of private contractors and respect for public service values 
(APSC 2001, 148-9; 2002, 7. 8-9; 2003, 10. 2-3).  Some (a diminishing minority) 
include no specific reference to APS values but, instead, rely on the contractors’ 
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adherence to relevant legislation covering the public sector, such as legislation on 
privacy and confidentiality in relation to personal information.  They thus recognise 
the relevance of some public service rules and standards to government contractors 
but prefer to rely on clearly stipulated rules rather than general values.  At the other 
extreme, some agencies stipulate complete adherence to the APS values. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for instance, is reported to have a standard 
clause in all its contracts that ‘the contractor must ensure that the specified personnel 
conduct themselves in accordance with the Values and Code of Conduct of the 
Australian Public Service’ (APSC 2001, 148).  More commonly, however, agencies 
single out certain relevant aspects of the APS Values and Code with which agencies 
must comply.  Which aspects are considered most relevant can be summarised in 
terms of particular distinctive public service values noted above - namely two 
outcome-related values (responsiveness to government and fair and impartial 
treatment of the public) and two process-related values (public accountability and 
merit appointment).  
Responsiveness to government 
All government contracts may be said to aim at responsiveness to government 
in the sense that all such contracts are intended to achieve government-determined 
objectives.  In the great majority of cases, this aim is achieved through careful 
stipulation of goods and services which the contractor is obliged to deliver rather than 
through explicit resort to the value of responsiveness as such.  However, the value of 
responsiveness is implicit in contractual terms that require regular consultation 
between the contractor and government officials and allow for the contractor to take 
note of changing government priorities.  Such clauses, for instance are standard in 
contracts for information technology and for human resources.  All partnership or 
relational contracts may be said to imply some reliance on the contractor’s general 
willingness to accommodate as yet unstated wishes of the government.  However, no 
contracts appear to explicitly require contractors to exercise the same sensitivity to 
government directions that are expected of public servants.  
Fair and impartial treatment of the public 
Private contractors provide publicly funded services directly to members of 
the public in many areas, including employment services, health and social welfare.  
Some of the requisite standards of service can be covered by contractual obligations 
to obey relevant legislation, for instance privacy and confidentiality of personal 
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information. However, the complex and sensitive nature of many services means that 
detailed specification of expected requirements, while essential to set the basic 
framework of the contracts, is not sufficient to guarantee satisfactory performance.  In 
addition to general commitments to behave professionally and ethically, contractors 
also need to treat members of the public according to the standards of fairness 
associated with public servants providing the same services. The Code of Conduct for 
the Job Network, for instance,  requires contractors to be treat clients ‘with  fairness 
and respect’ and ‘to consider their individual circumstances and backgrounds’. In 
effect, network providers are being required to follow the public service value (g) 
[that the APS] ‘delivers services fairly, effectively, impartially and courteously to the 
Australian public and is sensitive to the diversity of the Australian public’.  Other 
areas of service provision also make similar demands on private providers.  Thus the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs includes in its contracts for the 
management of detention centres for illegal immigrants a list of fundamental 
principles that need to be observed, beginning with ‘dignity (each detainee is treated 
with dignity and in a humane manner and is treated with respect; and the individuality 
of each detainee is recognised and acknowledged)’ (DIMIA 2004, Schedule 3).  By 
contrast, the Health Department takes a less coercive approach in relation to private 
nursing homes for the aged which are subsidised by public funds.  It publishes a Code 
of Ethics and Guide to Ethical Conduct for Residential Aged Care (DHA 2001) but 
relies on voluntary compliance on the part of providers rather than contractual 
obligation. 
Public accountability 
In general, private contractors, like other private companies, operate under a 
different accountability regime from public servants.  Ultimate accountability is to 
their owners rather than to the public and they are not subject to the range of 
accountability pressures that face public officials from the legislature, government 
auditors, ombudsmen and the media (Mulgan 2000).  The main avenue of public 
accountability of contractors is through performance of the contract and delivery of 
the defined outputs.  To monitor performance, governments frequently also insist on 
rights of access to relevant information. For instance, Centrelink (the Commonwealth 
agency responsible for administering social assistance payments) standardly requires 
all contractors to allow access to their premises, and to supply any records or other 
information ‘related to the contract’ (Centrelink 2002).  More broadly, contractors 
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may be required to ‘respond promptly to reasonable requests for advice or 
information’ (Defence 1998 cf DEST 2004).     
When contractors are providing a service directly to members of the public, 
additional accountability requirements apply, similar to those imposed on the public 
sector. For instance, providers in the Job Network are required to provide timely 
feedback and information to clients about decisions ..that could affect them’ and to 
have ‘a complaints process of which clients are made aware’ (DEWR 2003, Schedule 
2).  Their accountability also extends to the public’s right of access to personal 
information  as would be guaranteed under Freedom of Information legislation 
(DEWR 2003, Schedule 4).  More generally, the Code of Conduct obliges contractors 
to be ‘openly accountable for their actions’, in effect imposing a public service 
commitment to accountability as a value. 
None the less,  private contractors do not face the same accountability 
demands for information that are placed on public organisations.   In general, any 
information held by a public agency is liable to be revealed under public inquiry, 
subject only to certain limiting criteria, such as national security, cabinet 
confidentiality or privacy.  Information held by private organisations, on the other 
hand, is generally confidential to the organisation and its owners, with even 
shareholders having substantially less rights of access to their companies than citizens 
have to their governments. The internal financial dealings of contractors are kept 
commercially confidential. Private companies are not subject to government audit nor 
are they liable to be questioned by parliamentary committees.  In the Australian 
Commonwealth, contractors are still not directly subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman. Contractual requirements on contractors to provide more open access to 
certain limited types of information do not change this fundamental difference in 
principle.   
In debates over outsourcing, claims of commercial confidentiality have been 
heavily criticised because they have been used to shield information that would 
normally be available to the public through mechanisms such as parliamentary 
committees or government auditors (JCPAA 2000; Barrett 2001, 9-12).  Significantly, 
however, the criticism has been levelled against the politicians and officials who 
conceal their own politically embarrassing dealings with contractors under the 
spurious pretext of protecting the contractors’ competitive portion in the market.  
There has been little suggestion that the contractors themselves should reveal their 
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own commercial actions where they do not impinge on their dealings with 
government.  What private companies do and how they spend their money in fulfilling 
government contracts is generally seen as their business and not a matter for public 
scrutiny.  Overall, private contractors are not being obliged to submit public service 
accountability practices or values  
Merit appointment (including equal employment and workplace diversity) 
Another area in which public service values do not usually extend to private 
sector contractors is appointment conditions, including merit appointment and 
associated principles of equal opportunity and workplace diversity backed up by 
appeal procedures.   On the whole, contracts cover the goods and services that the 
government wishes to purchase, leaving the contractor to decide, within the law, the 
means by which these goods and services are to be provided.  Indeed, some of the 
most significant savings from outsourcing came from the fact that contractors are not 
subject to public service conditions of employment.  
For instance, in appointment procedures, there is normally no general proviso 
to appoint on merit and no bar on cronyism and nepotism. A government-employed 
supervisor of cleaning services is obliged to advertise positions and appoint on the 
basis of qualifications and experience.  A private company, on the other hand, 
cleaning the same offices under government contract, is free to employ friends and 
relations, no questions asked.   Adding in the fact that pay and conditions, particularly 
in unskilled work such as cleaning and catering, are often significantly below those 
applicable in the public sector, it is not surprising that outsourcing such services leads 
to substantial savings (Hodge 1998).   The main objection to private sector 
employment conditions has come from public sector unions, attempting to protect 
their own membership base from being undercut by cheaper or more flexible private 
sector employees.  But otherwise, practices such as favouritism or nepotism, which 
would be roundly condemned if performed by public servants, appear to be generally 
tolerated from government contractors.  
However, some agencies extend at least some of their own employment 
conditions to contractors.  Thus for instance, the Department of Immigration,  
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs requires all its contractors to comply with 
departmental processes relating to occupational health and safety, in addition to any 
general legal obligations that contractors would be under in this area.  Moreover, in 
relation to equal employment opportunity, it insists on compliance not only with the 
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Equal Employment Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 but also with 
the Department’s own workplace diversity program and its workplace behaviour 
strategy (quoted APSC 2002, 7.9).  Here contractors are being held to stricter 
employment standards than would otherwise prevail in the private sector, even if the 
full public service code is not being applied.  
Appointment procedures were the subject of  a recent controversy relating to 
church-based organisations undertaking job assistance contracts in the Job Network.  
In 2000, as religious organisations such as the Salvation Army and Mission Australia 
took on new staff to meet their newly expanded government contracts, prospective 
employees complained to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(HREOC) about being questioned on their religious beliefs and about being made to 
understand that subscribing to the religion in question was a condition of employment 
(HREOC 2000, ch 5).   
The Human Rights Commissioner argued that such questions were 
discriminatory (Canberra Times 5 August 2000), a claim fiercely contested by the 
Minister, Tony Abbott, who defended the right of religious organisations to protect 
their own values and beliefs and to employ their own co-religionists (Canberra Times 
12 September 2000).  Indeed, the Minister placed considerable weight on the capacity 
of traditional religious charities to offer particularly valuable services in this area (eg 
Abbott 1999). Subsequent guidelines issued by HREOC (HREOC undated) after 
lengthy consultation insist that requiring a religious test for a job is generally 
discriminatory under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986.  However, 
the law leaves open a number of exceptions if membership of the religion is related to 
the inherent requirements of the position and is needed to avoid offence to the 
religious susceptibilities of the members of the organisation.  In effect, religious 
organisations can offer preference to adherents of their faith, provided such adherence 
is justified in terms of the role and ethos of the organisation.   
The context of the original complaints suggests that what made discrimination 
on the basis of religion particularly objectionable in these cases was the fact that the 
positions in question were being funded under government contracts.  That is, it might 
be acceptable for church-based charities to insist on appointing their own adherents 
provided they were engaged to in purely private functions.  However, once the staff 
concerned undertook publicly funded and publicly authorised functions, such 
exclusiveness became discriminatory.  Significantly, however, the Commission’s 
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response implies that religious discrimination in employment is generally illegitimate 
(subject always to exceptions) regardless of whether the employer is publicly funded 
or not. That is, the Commission has defended a general ban on religious 
discrimination but has not sought to given any additional weight to the need to avoid 
such discrimination when private organisations are fulfilling public contracts.   
Thus, no official endorsement has been offered to the argument that public 
funding of a position requires that every member of the public should have an equal 
opportunity of applying for and securing that position. Accountability remains 
focused on the delivery of outcomes, including fair and impartial service delivery, 
with appointment procedures treated as a private internal matter not affecting 
performance (except in so far as they comply with general legislation applying to all 
sectors).  So long as members of religious organisations appointed on the basis of 
their religious faith can deal with the public fairly and without religious 
discrimination, no objection can be made against their securing preferential 
appointment.   
Relations with the public service 
A final context in which public service values may be applied to contractors is 
where the interaction between contractors and public servants and contractors in the 
performance of an outsourced service may compromise the public service’s own 
commitment to public service standards and values.  The concern is not so much that 
the contractors must themselves live up to the level expected of public servants but 
that they should not undermine the public servants’ own ethical behaviour.  One 
obvious such area is in the contracting process itself, where codes of conduct for 
contractors warn contractors against offering improper inducements to public officials 
or concealing potential conflicts of interest (Department of Defence 1998, DEST 
2004).  Another area is the outsourcing of personnel services where contractors are 
called on to administer a recruitment and employment regime that is subject to merit 
appointment principles and to accompanying standards of anti-discrimination and 
strict due process.   Here, full knowledge of public service values and commitment to 
their implementation is a necessary condition of successfully performing such a 
contract.  A majority of agencies that outsource their human resources functions make 
explicit reference in the contract to the need to abide by public service values (APSC 
2001, 148).   
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IV 
On the Australian experience, then, government agencies outsourcing services 
to private contractors not only require contractors to comply with certain specifically 
public service standards but also sometimes employ commitment to general public 
service values as one means by which such compliance can be assured.   However, 
available evidence suggests that such values are not being extended to all activities 
undertaken by contractors but that certain areas are being exempted, particularly 
strictly internal matters such as access to commercial information and appointment 
procedures which do not directly impinge on the public. When particular agencies, 
such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, include in their contracts a 
blanket reference to the observance of public service values, they do not literally 
intend to oblige contractors to abide by all such values in their internal operations.  
There is no evidence, at least, that the value clauses in contracts are being literally 
interpreted and comprehensively enforced.  More probably, the values are intended to 
apply only partially, most especially to those actions of the contractor which might 
affect the quality of the service provided and on the rights of citizens to fair treatment.  
In this case, the application of the values in practice depends on unspecified general 
understandings among the parties about where the values are relevant and where they 
are not. 
The Australian Public Service Commission itself, while stressing the 
importance of maintaining the values in outsourcing contexts, has been careful not to 
endorse complete compliance.  It notes that values will be particularly important when 
contractors are delivering services directly to members of the public (as in 
employment services or nursing homes).  It also argues that the focus will be more on 
values relevant to the outputs and outcomes desired by the government rather than 
those concerned with process. In the words of the current Commissioner, Andrew 
Podger: 
Generally speaking, the APS [Australian Public Service] Values and the Code 
of Conduct are particularly pertinent where services are being delivered by 
contractors to the public on behalf of the APS. However, not all of the Values and the 
Code are relevant even in these circumstances. The values relating to service delivery 
are critical, as is part of the APS Values relating to responsiveness to government in 
implementing the government's policies and programs. At the same time, values 
applying to the Service's internal workplace relationships are not relevant to 
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contractors' own employment practices, although other Commonwealth employment 
legislation, such as occupational health and safety and anti-discrimination will apply 
(Podger 2003) 
In other words, the Commission recognises that internal workplace values 
such as merit appointment, fair and flexible working conditions, rights of review and 
so on, are not generally being applied to private contractors.  The major emphasis is 
on the desired outcome, on whether the contractor has delivered the service in 
question to the required standard and within the negotiated price.   How the contractor 
goes about achieving this outcome is to be left to the contractors’ discretion and 
excluded from public scrutiny, subject to the normal legal requirements to which all 
company actions are subject, whether acting under government contracts or not.   
How robust this demarcation will prove in the long term is open to question.  
That some agencies are requiring full, unqualified commitment to public service 
values leaves open the possibility that compliance could be extended into hitherto 
quarantined areas.  For instance, expectations of public accountability could begin to 
penetrate the internal workings of companies that depend on the public purse.  
Contracting companies depending on the public purse could find themselves under 
public scrutiny for the level of their salaries or executive perks. The religious 
discrimination case reveals the unease with which certain sections of the public, at 
least, view the right of church-based organisations to use public funds in breach of the 
merit principle.  
The rationale for distinctive public service values depends in part on the fact 
that government policies and public funds belong ultimately to the citizens.  Citizens 
therefore have a right to determine that their own funds are spent fairly and frugally 
and their own policies are implemented according to due process.  In this case, the 
public should arguably be concerned to know how its money is spent and its policies 
applied, whether the organisation involved is a government agency or a private 
contractor.  Once responsibility passes to a private provider of a public service, why 
should the concerns for transparency, frugality and merit appointment become so 
attenuated?  The habit of excluding private contractors from the high standards of 
ethical conduct applied to public servants may be a residue of an era when the lines 
between the sectors were less blurred and private contractors were less engaged in 
performing public functions. 
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Institutional linkages between the public and private sectors can therefore be 
expected to impose pressure for greater convergence between public and private 
sector values.   Indeed, many non-government organisation are already drawing 
attention, not necessarily favourably, to such convergence, particularly in the 
nonprofit sector.  Some members of the nonprofit sector have been concerned about 
the damaging effects of government contracting on their own distinctive ethos 
(Lipsky and Smith 1990, Schwartz 2001).  If the demands of working for government 
are threatening to impose secular values on religious organisations, such 
secularisation could involve a greater acceptance of values traditionally associated 
with the public service, such as respect for fairness and openness. 
Whether private contractors will ever be subject to standards as strict as those 
currently listed in the APS Values is highly unlikely.   Too much insistence on public 
service values will tend to discourage private companies from tendering for public 
services and will erode the positive benefits that derive from employing more flexible 
private providers.  Contrary pressures, both from the providers themselves and from 
governments as purchasers, will therefore work against imposing additional process 
constraints on contractors.  However, the status quo appears far from stable.  A little 
more than a decade of extensive outsourcing public services has already seen 
considerable evolution, as classic contracts have given way to relational contracts and 
the importance of shared values between the contracting parties has been given 
greater weight.  The line between public and private is likely to become even more 
blurred and the distinctiveness of public sector values even less clear-cut.  
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